Table of Contents
Buying consulting used to be an exercise in managing variability. Partners differed in style, in commercial appetite, in how far they were willing to bend when a deal mattered. Pricing reflected this. So did negotiations. Procurement often complained about inconsistency, but inconsistency at least meant room to maneuver.
What is striking today is how much of that variability has disappeared.
Across firms, geographies, and partners, consulting has become calmer, more aligned, and more predictable in the way it presents itself commercially. Prices are defended with confidence. Deviations are rare and carefully justified. The tone is professional, measured, and remarkably similar from one firm to the next. This is often described as the industry “growing up,” and in some respects that description is accurate.
Still, industries do not become this coherent by accident.
Uniformity at scale rarely comes from shared values alone. It usually reflects something more prosaic: incentives that are no longer open to interpretation. When commercial behavior converges so neatly, it is because the cost of improvisation has quietly increased.
Most clients sense this shift without quite articulating it. Nothing has visibly broken. Projects continue to run. Trust remains the preferred vocabulary. Procurement processes are followed, sometimes even praised. And yet the experience of buying consulting feels subtly different: more controlled, less negotiable, less dependent on who happens to be sitting across the table.
That change did not start with procurement, nor with clients becoming more demanding. It started inside the firms themselves, in how they are organized, governed, and rewarded.
Understanding that internal shift is the only way to make sense of the current balance of power in consulting procurement. And it is where this story actually begins.
I. Consulting is not just another business.
Consulting firms were originally organised like law firms for a very simple reason: the product was not a methodology, a process, or even an answer. It was a person. More precisely, it was the client’s confidence in that person.
Early consultants were hired because senior executives trusted them to think clearly under pressure, to say the unsayable politely, and to absorb responsibility when decisions went wrong. The firm existed largely to provide a collective surname, a sense of seriousness, and a billing mechanism. Power followed reputation. Revenue followed relationships. Governance followed whoever had founded the place and had the loudest clients.
This model still works perfectly well, which is why it continues to underpin a large part of the boutique consulting market. As long as a firm’s ambition is proportional to the number of genuinely exceptional individuals it contains, there is no urgent need to industrialise anything. The moment you try to grow beyond that constraint, however, sentiment gives way to logistics.
Scaling Consulting Required Sharing What Made Partners Special
Growth forced consulting firms to confront an awkward truth: what made partners valuable also made them scarce. If clients wanted more of the firm than a handful of individuals could personally deliver, the firm had to find a way to reproduce expertise without cloning its rainmakers.
That is how the familiar consulting machinery emerged. Junior consultants were hired to extend reach and reduce cost, but also to learn by imitation. Knowledge was documented, packaged, and stored, not because consultants suddenly became altruistic, but because expertise that lives only in one person’s head cannot be scheduled or sold repeatedly. Career ladders were formalised to manage expectations. Titles multiplied to make hierarchy look developmental rather than economic.
At this point, consulting stopped being a collection of advisors and became an organisation with employees. Some people still brought in the work. Many others did the work. The firm now depended less on singular brilliance and more on coordination. It still called itself a partnership, but it had started behaving like a business that required control.
This was not a moral shift. It was arithmetic.
The Partnership Remained. The Autonomy Did Not.
Most large consulting firms still describe themselves as partnerships, and in a narrow legal sense many of them still are. Partners remain the most senior status. They still embody the firm externally. They are still the people clients expect to see when things matter.
What changed is that partnership stopped meaning “sovereignty.”
In many firms, partners are no longer shareholders. In others, they are shareholders but not the only ones. External investors, minority stakes, or structured ownership vehicles now sit alongside them, introducing expectations that are familiar in any other industry and deeply inconvenient in a profession built on self-image.
Dividends have to be paid. Growth has to be demonstrated. Cash has to be justified. Forecasts have to hold. Suddenly, decisions that used to be framed as matters of professional judgment are evaluated as financial risks. Partners are still influential, but they increasingly operate within boundaries they did not draw themselves.
The partnership survives, but as a negotiated arrangement rather than an unquestioned authority. It still tells the story. It just no longer writes the ending alone.
Why Private Equity’s Arrival Was Entirely Predictable
Once consulting reached this stage, private equity did not so much enter the industry as acknowledge the obvious. Here was a sector with high margins, resilient demand, and clients who returned with impressive regularity. Better still, much of the value creation had already been systematised. The firm no longer collapsed if a single individual left. Relationships had become institutional. Delivery had become leveraged.
Then technology arrived and made the need for capital unavoidable. Digital platforms, data assets, and now generative AI require sustained investment. Building these capabilities through retained earnings alone is slow and politically painful. External capital, by contrast, comes with a clear promise and very clear expectations.
Private equity did not turn consulting into a business. Consulting had already done that itself. What private equity brought was honesty about what the business had become and impatience with the remaining illusions.
And once those illusions begin to fall away, the consulting industry starts behaving less like a profession that happens to make money and more like a financial asset that happens to sell advice.
Which, for procurement, is where things start to get interesting.
II. Consulting Learns to Hate Uncertainty
For all its confidence, consulting has always suffered from a structural inconvenience: revenue arrives in bursts. Projects start and stop. Cycles come and go. Partners retire, clients change jobs, priorities evaporate. It is a lucrative business, but not a reassuring one.
As long as consulting firms were fully owned and governed by their partners, this volatility was tolerable. It was framed as the price of independence, the proof that the firm was exposed to the real world rather than protected from it. Uncertainty was even worn as a badge of honour, a sign that consulting remained a profession rather than a factory.
That posture becomes harder to sustain once partners are no longer the only ones waiting for a return.
The moment external shareholders enter the picture, or when internal ownership itself becomes more financialised, uncertainty stops being romantic. Dividends do not enjoy surprises. Neither do investors. What was once described as “the nature of the business” begins to look suspiciously like a risk to be engineered out.
This is the quiet starting point of the current transformation.
Private Equity’s Job Is Not to Innovate. It Is to Make the Story Easier to Sell.
Private equity is often credited—or blamed—for reshaping consulting. In reality, its role is far more prosaic and far more effective.
Private equity does not ask whether a business is intellectually noble. It asks whether the business can look better, more stable, and more predictable within a finite time horizon. The objective is not to reinvent the bride, but to make her appear calmer, more reliable, and easier to introduce to the next suitor.
In consulting, that translates into a very specific agenda. Revenue must become smoother. Margins must become more defensible. Client relationships must survive personnel changes. Growth must look less cyclical and more structural. None of this requires destroying the consulting model. It requires supplementing it.
Which is precisely what we are seeing.
The Great Convergence: Consulting Chases Software, Software Chases Consulting
The most striking development in professional services over the past decade is not consolidation within consulting. It is convergence across categories.
Consulting firms have been moving steadily toward software, platforms, and managed services, not out of technological enthusiasm, but out of financial logic. Tools create stickiness. Platforms create recurring revenue. Managed services replace episodic projects with contractual continuity. Predictability improves. So does valuation.
At the same time, software and technology players have been moving in the opposite direction. They acquire or build consulting capabilities to increase margins, accelerate adoption, and justify higher price points. Advisory work lends credibility. It also turns product sales into “transformations,” which are much harder to benchmark and much easier to expand.
Private equity loves this two-way movement because it solves two problems at once. Consulting becomes less volatile. Software becomes more profitable. Different starting points, same destination.
This is not a theory. It is visible in balance sheets, acquisition strategies, and operating models across the market.
From Accenture to Everyone Else: The Model Becomes the Norm
Accenture understood this dynamic early. Consulting was never the endgame; it was the spearhead. Advisory work opened doors, legitimised relationships, and paved the way for technology integration, outsourcing, and long-term services. The model was sometimes criticised for being less “pure” than traditional strategy consulting. It was also spectacularly effective.
What was once described as a peculiarity is now becoming the template.
The Big Four have expanded far beyond audit and tax into consulting, technology, and managed services, building platforms and recurring offerings that make their revenue profiles look increasingly industrial. Large IT services players have invested heavily in advisory capabilities to move up the value chain and protect margins. Even firms that built their reputation on intellectual distance and strategic purity now develop tools, launch platforms, and flirt openly with managed services.
The result is a landscape where the old categories no longer describe reality. Consulting firms sell software. Software firms sell advice. Service providers sell “journeys.” Everyone claims to be end-to-end. Everyone claims to be indispensable.
When Everything Becomes a Patchwork, Uncertainty Loses Its Seat at the Table
From an investor’s perspective, this patchwork is not messy. It is elegant. Multiple revenue streams, cross-selling opportunities, and longer client lifetimes reduce exposure to any single line of business. The firm becomes less dependent on heroic partners and more reliant on systems that quietly renew themselves.
From the outside, the industry still looks familiar. The logos are the same. The language has barely changed. Consulting is still consulting, at least rhetorically.
But structurally, something fundamental has shifted. The industry is no longer organised around discrete professions with clear boundaries. It is being reassembled into portfolios of capabilities designed to stabilise cash flows and maximise optionality.
Once that logic takes hold, the question is no longer whether consulting has changed.
It is whether anyone is still pretending that uncertainty is part of the value proposition.
III. When Everyone Buys Consulting, No One Owns It
Unlike most major spend categories, consulting has never had a natural home.
Financial services sit comfortably with Finance. HR services have their place. IT assistance, however sprawling, usually lands somewhere between technology and operations. Consulting, by contrast, seeps into everything. Strategy, transformation, digital, HR, finance, operations, change, data, ESG — consulting is wherever ambiguity lives.
The result is familiar to most large organisations: consulting spend is fragmented by design. It is spread across functions, budgets, and categories, each with its own logic, priorities, and vocabulary. Procurement taxonomies often reflect this reality by folding consulting into multiple categories rather than treating it as a coherent whole.
This arrangement is understandable. It is also deeply problematic.
Because when a category has no clear owner, it also has no natural defender.
Consolidation Is Hard Not Because Procurement Is Weak, but Because the Category Is Structurally Elusive
Most large organisations like to believe they have a reasonable grasp of their consulting spend. After all, they approve the projects, sign the contracts, and pay the invoices. How mysterious can it be?
Mysterious enough, it turns out, that very few can say with confidence what they spend on consulting as a whole — not because the data is missing, but because the question itself is politically awkward. Consulting does not sit anywhere; it circulates. It attaches itself to initiatives, programs, transformations, urgencies. It hides inside projects that sound operational, digital, or strategic depending on who is presenting the slide.
The ambiguity is not accidental. A “transformation office” sounds reassuringly permanent. A diagnostic tool looks suspiciously like software. Three years of “advisory support” feels long enough to stop asking whether it is still advisory at all. Each label is defensible in isolation, and completely misleading in aggregate.
As a result, the organisation never quite decides who is supposed to care about the total. Spend exists, but responsibility dissolves. Everyone controls their piece. No one owns the whole. This is not a theoretical problem. When organisations do attempt to consolidate their consulting spend, the picture that emerges is often more revealing than expected. This dynamic has been examined in more detail through work on consulting spend analysis.
Steering happens locally, while exposure accumulates globally.
This arrangement is often described as complex. It is better described as comfortable.
Because while clients debate definitions, suppliers enjoy the luxury of clarity.
One Client, One KAM. Several Buyers, Several Incentives.
From the consulting firm’s perspective, the picture is refreshingly uncomplicated.
There is one client. One account. One person in charge of it.
That Key Account Manager does not distinguish between “types” of services in any meaningful way. Consulting, IT delivery, managed services, platforms, licences — these are internal distinctions. The account is the unit of reality. Everything sold to that logo belongs to the same commercial story, the same growth ambition, the same performance evaluation.
On the client side, the same supplier often encounters a very different landscape. The relationship is split across categories, budgets, and governance layers. Strategy here. IT consulting there. Managed services somewhere else. Each category manager operates within a defined perimeter, negotiates seriously, and believes—quite reasonably—that control is being exercised.
It is. Just not at the level that matters.
Because while category managers are accountable for their slice, the supplier’s account leadership is accountable for the whole. The asymmetry is not in skill or intent, but in scope. One side sees fragments. The other sees the totality. One side negotiates locally. The other optimises globally.
This is where the imbalance becomes structural rather than tactical.
A firm can afford to be disciplined in one area because growth elsewhere compensates. A concession granted in consulting is recovered through services. A tougher negotiation on rates is absorbed through volume, duration, or productisation. None of this requires coordination across buyers on the client side. It requires exactly one thing: a unified view of the account.
Which the supplier has. Systematically.
Calling this manipulation would flatter the client organisation. Nothing is being hidden. Nothing is being forced. The supplier is simply behaving as a coherent entity, facing a client that is not.
And coherence, as it turns out, is a formidable competitive advantage.
Internal Competition Is a Gift to the Supplier
Things become more complicated once internal incentives enter the picture.
In most organisations, category managers do not design the system they operate in. They inherit it. Taxonomies are legacy artefacts. Budget structures predate current ambitions. Consulting sits where it has always sat: everywhere and nowhere. And because there is no clear owner for consulting as a whole, there is little incentive — and often little authority — to rethink the model.
Against that backdrop, individual performance metrics do the rest.
When category managers are measured on indicators such as EYR, year-on-year performance, or savings delivered within a defined perimeter, ownership of spend stops being a governance question and becomes a personal one. PwC or Accenture is no longer just a supplier; it is a sizeable economic territory attached to someone’s objectives, evaluation, and bonus. Expecting spontaneous collaboration in that context is optimistic.
Defensive behaviour is not a failure of character. It is a predictable response to the way success is defined.
Information sharing becomes selective, not out of malice, but out of self-preservation. Coordination remains a stated ambition, but an unrewarded one. Everyone is encouraged to optimise locally, while the organisation quietly hopes the whole will somehow take care of itself.
From the supplier’s point of view, this configuration is not exploitative. It is simply convenient.
Multiple entry points. Multiple internal narratives. Multiple buyers, each acting rationally within their mandate. One account strategy, managed coherently across the entire relationship.
No dramatic power plays are required. The advantage does not come from cunning, but from alignment. One side is organised around the client as an economic unit. The other is organised around KPIs that fragment that unit by design.
As François Dupuy might put it, behind every “deviant” behaviour sits a perfectly reasonable indicator.
Which makes this less a procurement problem than a management one.
Blindness Is Collective, Not Individual
It would be unfair to frame this as a failure of individual procurement professionals. Most category managers do exactly what they are asked to do within their scope. They run proper processes. They negotiate professionally. They challenge assumptions.
The problem is collective.
Without clear governance and deliberate ways of working across categories, no one sees the full picture. Commercial signals are interpreted locally rather than systemically. The supplier’s behaviour looks reasonable in isolation, even as its position strengthens globally.
By the time the organisation realises that a handful of consulting firms have become structurally indispensable, the mechanisms that enabled this outcome are so embedded that reversing them feels disruptive, political, and ungrateful.
Which is, of course, precisely how the suppliers prefer it.
IV. What Clients Must Do — If They Want to Re-Enter the Game
Let’s start by clearing a recurring confusion.
Consulting is a category. It meets every criterion procurement itself has defined over the years: a recognisable supplier market, overlapping players, comparable economics, and recurring buying patterns. Firms compete with one another. Clients arbitrate between them. Rates, models, and risks can be benchmarked. The fact that consulting feels intellectually superior to office supplies does not exempt it from economic reality.
Declaring consulting “too specific” or “too strategic” to be treated as a category is rarely a sophisticated insight. More often, it is a polite way of avoiding the organisational effort that category management requires once things become complex.
Once organisations reach that level of complexity, the question is no longer whether consulting can be treated as a category, but whether it is being managed as one. Approaches to consulting category management explore what that shift looks like in practice.
The irony is that suppliers never hesitate on this point. They treat consulting as a category perfectly well. They simply do so from the sell side.
But Consulting Does Not Live Alone — It Belongs to “Intellectual Services”
Where organisations do make a legitimate mistake is not in calling consulting a category, but in managing it as if it were self-contained.
In reality, consulting is part of a broader family of what, in French, we would call services intellectuels: advisory services, legal and financial expertise, HR services, IT advisory, transformation support, managed services, platforms, and tools. From the supplier’s point of view, these services already form a portfolio. From the client’s side, they are often split into neat organisational boxes that no longer reflect how the market actually operates.
This is where the gap opens.
Suppliers design integrated offers that move effortlessly from advice to implementation, from tools to services, from one budget to another. Clients respond with taxonomies that mirror internal reporting lines rather than external reality. The result is not control, but fragmentation.
In other words, suppliers think in portfolios. Clients still think in org charts.
Multiple Category Managers Are Not the Problem. Silence Is.
Large organisations with serious spend in intellectual services almost always end up with several category managers. This is not dysfunction. It is arithmetic. Volume increases, complexity follows, and work gets split. No one should be shocked by that.
What is more surprising is the faith placed in what happens next.
Somehow, organisations convince themselves that if enough competent people sit next to one another on an org chart, coordination will emerge organically. That roles will clarify themselves over time. That interfaces will form by goodwill. That trade-offs will be resolved through mature conversation rather than formal arbitration.
They rarely are.
When roles, responsibilities, and escalation paths remain implicit, category managers behave exactly as the system encourages them to behave. They protect their perimeter. They optimise what they are measured on. They hesitate before making decisions that might improve the collective picture at the expense of their local numbers. Not because they are territorial, but because they are rational.
This is usually the moment when “silo mentality” enters the conversation, as if it were a character flaw rather than a design feature.
Clear governance does not turn organisations into choirs singing in harmony. What it does is remove the ambiguity that makes silent competition so comfortable. It forces the organisation to decide who arbitrates conflicts, how trade-offs are made, and when collective interest takes precedence over local optimisation.
Without that, collaboration remains what it so often is in large companies: a shared value, frequently invoked, rarely rewarded.
Incentives Shape Behaviour. Always.
This is the point where good intentions usually go to die.
As long as performance metrics reward individual optimisation exclusively, collective behaviour will remain theoretical. This is not cynicism; it is basic organisational sociology. Or, as François Dupuy might put it, behind every apparently deviant behaviour sits a perfectly rational KPI.
This does not mean abandoning individual accountability. It means complementing it.
Effective organisations design incentives that recognise both individual performance and collective outcomes. Category managers are rewarded for managing their scope well, but also for contributing to a coherent supplier strategy across intellectual services. Cooperation stops being an act of goodwill and becomes a condition of success.
Anything else is an invitation to polite resistance.
One Supplier, One Contract, One Voice — Internally Coordinated
The final adjustment is the most visible, and often the most resisted.
If suppliers face a fragmented client, they will behave as a unified one. If clients want to rebalance that asymmetry, they must return the favour.
That means one contract per strategic supplier at group level, even if services are delivered across categories. It means one internal point of coordination per supplier, responsible for ensuring consistency, not for replacing category managers. And it means regular, structured alignment between all category managers dealing with the same firm.
Suppliers already operate this way. They call it account management.
Clients usually call it “too complicated.”
What Changes When Clients Do This
Nothing miraculous occurs. Consulting does not become cheap, suppliers do not lose their confidence, and power does not suddenly change sides.
What happens first is far less glamorous: the spend becomes visible.
Not visible in theory, or in a once-a-year consolidation exercise, but visible in a way that makes patterns uncomfortable. It becomes harder to re-label consulting as something else when categories talk to one another. It becomes harder to move advisory work into “services,” “tools,” or “support” without someone noticing. The quiet migrations that once went unquestioned start requiring explanations.
That visibility has consequences.
Once the picture is clearer, category managers stop playing whack-a-mole and start doing what they were hired to do. They anticipate demand instead of reacting to it. They distinguish between projects that genuinely require senior advisory firepower and those that mainly need capacity. They build category strategies rather than emergency responses. And, crucially, they can finally have adult conversations with stakeholders about trade-offs, timing, and alternatives.
This is also when the conversation with suppliers changes tone.
Not because the client suddenly has leverage, but because the client finally has coherence. The supplier can no longer compensate discipline in one area with opacity in another quite as easily. Discussions about scope, pricing, and delivery become connected rather than episodic. Surprises do not disappear, but they become harder to manufacture.
The end result is not heroically lower spend. It is something far more prosaic and far more valuable: the right consultants, for the right projects, at prices that no longer feel accidental.
Which, incidentally, is what category management was supposed to deliver in the first place.
Conclusion – Consulting Didn’t Get Disrupted. It Got a CFO.
Clients never benefited from consulting being a black box. They lived with it.
For a long time, consulting was expensive, opaque, and faintly irritating — but it was also limited. It sat close to the C-suite, appeared episodically, and rarely spilled across the organisation. Complaining about fees was part of the ritual, but scrutiny remained selective. The inconvenience was contained.
That is no longer the case.
Consulting is now everywhere. It runs through strategy, operations, IT, HR, finance, transformation offices, platforms, and managed services. It shapes decisions far beyond the executive floor. With that spread came visibility, and with visibility came impatience. What used to be tolerated as an elite black box has become unacceptable as a systemic spend.
Private equity did not create this tension. It simply arrived at a moment when consulting firms were already scaling, professionalising, and seeking predictability. The capital followed the logic. The CFO followed the partner.
The real change is not on the supply side. It is on the client side. In a world where consulting firms manage accounts coherently and portfolios deliberately, clients can no longer afford to remain passive, fragmented, or organisationally nostalgic.
Consulting did not get disrupted.
It got a CFO.
And clients now need to decide whether they will continue to complain about the price — or finally organise themselves to understand what they are buying, why, and at what cost.
If your organisation still manages it in fragments, the imbalance is structural — not negotiable.
Consulting Quest helps CPOs and executive teams regain clarity and coherence across consulting and intellectual services, so suppliers face one client, not many silos.
👉 Book a free consultation to assess how consulting is really managed in your organisation.






